Many of their photos of Native Americans were packaged and sold as postcards. This image was included in the negatives the Cherringtons left behind when they sold out to Thomas Cronise, which became part of the collection Cronise donated to OHS. This unidentified Grand Ronde woman and child posed for Indian agent Andrew Kershaw in what is likely the s. Members of the Grand Ronde continue to collect plants and nuts from the mountain and hold gatherings at the summit.
Tom opened his own Salem studio in under his own name. His wife Nellie and son Harry went into business with him and eventually took over the studio in when Tom died. Harry Cronise kept the studio open into the s. He took hundreds of photographs of people at Chemawa and in the Salem area, and the Oregon Historical Society holds many of the original negatives. Fortunately, Cronise attached names to most of his photographs, and while we include them here it is not always clear which person in the image belongs to that name.
This is likely a result of Cronise's accounting system—the person who commissioned the entry was named, and others in the photo were listed as "friends" or "family. OHS OHS OrHi OHS cn OHS cnc. OHS CN OHS, , Give name and address of each physician who has prescribed for or attended you within the past ten years, and for what disease and ailments? Name, Dr.
Patton, McFall, Missouri. For what disease or ailment? Bilious attack. Has your husband or wife or any other immediate member of your family any tuberculous disease? Only sister had, as stated. It was admitted at the trial that the insured died February 28th, , having paid all premiums due upon his policies, and that proofs of his death were made, such proofs stating that he died of progressive anesmia.
The company denied all liability on its policies, upon the ground that each of the answers to the above questions was untrue, and known to be so by the applicant when he made them. And at the trial it was offered to be proved and the offer was rejected, the company duly excepting that such answers were not true, and when made were known to be untrue. The case was brought here under the act of March 3d, , chap. At the trial in the circuit court the insurance company made several requests for instructions.
The trial court refused each request of the company and an exception to its action was duly taken; and it charged the jury the company excepting that the Missouri statute was applicable to this case, and not unconstitutional, and that the defendant company could not avoid liability on its policy by reason of any representations by the insured in his application, unless the jury found that the matters to which such representations had reference actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy, by its terms, was to become due and payable.enter
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Although the assignments of error are numberous, we do not deem it necessary to notice any questions except those growing out of the application of the Missouri statute to this case. As to the purpose and scope of that statute, we need only refer to the decisions of the highest court of Missouri, whose province it is to declare its meaning and effect, while it is the province of this court to adjudge whether the statute, as interpreted, is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
We do not stop to inquire whether, having due regard to its words, the statute might not have been differently construed by the state court, but accept its judgment as indicating what it is to be taken to mean. In Schuermann v. Union Cent. This doctrine of warranties, in the extent to which it had grown and was applied, was something peculiar to insurance companies, and was therefore thought the subject of special legislation, in a law which properly undertook to affect insurance companies alone in that particular.
By a long and hurtful practice of a given policy peculiarly their own, insurance companies had stamped themselves as a class, to which alone legislation might properly address itself, in that regard. In the subsequent case of Kern v. Supreme Lodge, A.
The statute draws no distinction between innocent and fraudulent misrepresentations, and the courts have no right to draw any such distinction. The test applied by the statute is whether 'the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy is to become due and payable,' and the power to determine that question is vested by the statute in the jury, and not in the court. Connecticut Mut. The purpose was to give full force and effect to the statute, and to hold that no misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, when based upon a warranty of truth by the terms of the policy or not, shall be a defense, 'unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy is to become due and payable.
We take it, then, that the statute, if enforced, cuts off any defense by a life insurance company, based upon false and fraudulent statements in the application, unless the matter misrepresented actually contributed to the death of the insured. Is the statute, therefore, to be held repugnant to the 14th Amendment? Does it, in such case, deprive the insurance company of its 'liberty' or property without due process of law, or deny to it the equal protection of the laws? Although the statute in some degree restricts the company's power of contracting, and is so worded that the beneficiaries of its policy may sometimes reap the fruits of fraud practised upon its by the insured, we cannot, for that reason, hold that the state may not, so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, regulate the business of life insurance to the extent indicated.
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It is true that this court has said that the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against deprivation otherwise than by due process of law embraces the right to pursue a lawful calling and enter into all contracts proper, necessary, and essential to the carrying out of the purposes of such calling. Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, U. It is true, also, that a corporation of one state, doing business in another state, under such circumstances as to be directly subject to its process at the instance of suitors, may invoke the protection of that clause of the 14th Amendment which declares that no state shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. McClung, U.
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But it is equally the doctrine of this court that the power, whether called police, governmental, or legislative, exists in each state, by appropriate legislation, not forbidden by its own Constitution or by the Constitution of the United States, to determine for its people all questions or matters relating to its purely domestic or internal affairs, and, 'to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its jurisdiction, and, therefore, to provide for the public convenience and the public good.
Ohio, U. We are informed by the decisions of the supreme court of Missouri that life insurance companies doing business in that state often secured contracts under which they could defeat all recovery upon a policy, and retain all premiums paid by the insured, if it appeared in proof that the application for insurance contained an inaccurate or untrue statement, however innocently made, as to matters having no real or substantial connection whatever with the death of the insured, and which were in no sense material to the risk.
This was deemed an evil practice, to be remedied by legislation. Of course, the state, if it had seen proper, might have excepted from the operation of the statute cases in which the insured, by his representations when obtaining a policy, perpetrated a fraud upon the company, or made untrue statements in his application as to matters material to the risk. But that remedy was deemed inadequate to prevent wrong and injustice.